Interesting talk: Generative Models for Visual Objects and Object Recognition via Bayseian Inference

 

Speaker: Fei-Fei Li, Princeton University

Generative Models for Visual Objects and Object Recognition via Bayesian Inference

 

 

Interesting talk: Trainable visual models for object classification

Speaker: Andrew Zisserman, Univ. of Oxford.

The lecture is available on  http://videolectures.net/lmcv04_zisserman_tvmoc/

CS Conference Ranking

Computer vision 분야의 양대 conference CVPR & ICCV.

졸업할수 있을까??  ㅎㅎ 긍정적인 마인드로 다시 분발하자~

AREA: Artificial Intelligence and Related Subjects

  Rank 1:
       AAAI: American Association for AI National Conference
       CVPR: IEEE Conf on Comp Vision and Pattern Recognition
       IJCAI: Intl Joint Conf on AI
       ICCV: Intl Conf on Computer Vision
       ICML: Intl Conf on Machine Learning
       KDD: Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining
       KR:  Intl Conf on Principles of KR & Reasoning
       NIPS: Neural Information Processing Systems
       UAI: Conference on Uncertainty in AI
       ICAA: International Conference on Autonomous Agents
       ACL: Annual Meeting of the ACL (Association of Computational Linguistics)

  Rank 2:
       AID: Intl Conf on AI in Design
       AI-ED: World Conference on AI in Education
       CAIP: Inttl Conf on Comp. Analysis of Images and Patterns
       CSSAC: Cognitive Science Society Annual Conference
       ECCV: European Conference on Computer Vision
       EAI: European Conf on AI
       EML: European Conf on Machine Learning
       GP: Genetic Programming Conference
       IAAI: Innovative Applications in AI
       ICIP: Intl Conf on Image Processing
       ICNN/IJCNN: Intl (Joint) Conference on Neural Networks
       ICPR: Intl Conf on Pattern Recognition
       ICDAR: International Conference on Document Analysis and Recognition
       ICTAI: IEEE conference on Tools with AI
       AMAI:  Artificial Intelligence and Maths
       DAS: International Workshop on Document Analysis Systems
       WACV:  IEEE Workshop on Apps of Computer Vision
       COLING: International Conference on Computational Liguistics
       EMNLP: Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing

  Rank 3:
       PRICAI: Pacific Rim Intl Conf on AI
       AAI: Australian National Conf on AI
       ACCV: Asian Conference on Computer Vision
       AI*IA: Congress of the Italian Assoc for AI
       ANNIE: Artificial Neural Networks in Engineering
       ANZIIS: Australian/NZ Conf on Intelligent Inf. Systems
       CAIA: Conf on AI for Applications
       CAAI: Canadian Artificial Intelligence Conference
       ASADM: Chicago ASA Data Mining Conf: A Hard Look at DM
       EPIA:  Portuguese Conference on Artificial Intelligence
       FCKAML: French Conf on Know. Acquisition & Machine Learning
       ICANN: International Conf on Artificial Neural Networks
       ICCB: International Conference on Case-Based Reasoning
       ICGA: International Conference on Genetic Algorithms
       ICONIP: Intl Conf on Neural Information Processing
       IEA/AIE: Intl Conf on Ind. & Eng. Apps of AI & Expert Sys
       ICMS: International Conference on Multiagent Systems
       ICPS: International conference on Planning Systems
       IWANN: Intl Work-Conf on Art & Natural Neural Networks
       PACES: Pacific Asian Conference on Expert Systems
       SCAI: Scandinavian Conference on Artifical Intelligence
       SPICIS: Singapore Intl Conf on Intelligent System
       PAKDD: Pacific-Asia Conf on Know. Discovery & Data Mining
       SMC: IEEE Intl Conf on Systems, Man and Cybernetics
       PAKDDM: Practical App of Knowledge Discovery & Data Mining
       WCNN: The World Congress on Neural Networks
       WCES: World Congress on Expert Systems
       INBS: IEEE Intl Symp on Intell. in Neural \& Bio Systems
       ASC: Intl Conf on AI and Soft Computing
       PACLIC: Pacific Asia Conference on Language, Information and Computation
       ICCC: International Conference on Chinese Computing

  Others:
       ICRA: IEEE Intl Conf on Robotics and Automation
       NNSP: Neural Networks for Signal Processing
       ICASSP: IEEE Intl Conf on Acoustics, Speech and SP
       GCCCE: Global Chinese Conference on Computers in Education
       ICAI:  Intl Conf on Artificial Intelligence
       AEN: IASTED Intl Conf on AI, Exp Sys & Neural Networks
       WMSCI: World Multiconfs on Sys, Cybernetics & Informatics

Charles Shaw wine

Trader joe’s에서 구입한 charles shaw wine…

가격대비 ($1.99) 맛이 좋다..  organic food를 맘껏 즐길수 있는 trader joe’s 가 집 근처에 있다는 사실이 왠지 즐겁다..

시간…

                     

                     학교에서만 지내다보니… 시간 관념없이 살아가다…

                             어느날 문득 달라지고 있는 주변을 보면서…

                               두려움과 허무함이 밀려올 때가 있다…

[人터뷰] NYT ‘독도광고’ 주역 서경덕씨…”日 교과서 왜곡, 美 유력지에 알리겠다”

[스포츠서울닷컴│강경윤기자] ‘백범’ 김구 선생을 연상시키는 안경을 쓴 이 남자. 한국에 대한 사랑이 대단하다. 민족주의자 혹은 애국주의자냐고 물었다. 하지만 돌아오는 대답은 “꼭 그런 것은 아니다”였다. 단지 그는 다음 세대에 부끄럽지 않은 한국인이 되고 싶다는 말로 대신했다.

지난 1996년부터 서경덕씨는 200여개의 도시를 직접 방문하며 한국을 알렸다. 그동안 쌓은 항공 마일리지가 50만 점이 넘는다. 아무도 시키지 않았지만 한국을 알리기 위해 연예인보다 더 바쁘게, 정치인보다 더 치열하게 살아왔다. 지금까지 노력은 ‘무한도전’에 가까웠다.

◆ “평범한 대학생, 그의 운명이 바뀐 계기?”
12년 전 서경덕씨는 ‘세계일주’가 꿈인 평범한 대학생이었다. 1996년 그가 생애 첫 해외 배낭여행을 떠난 것도 그 이유에서다. 떨리는 마음으로 유럽행 비행기에 올랐던 그는 당시만 해도 그가 대한민국 PR 전문가가 되리라고는 상상도 못했다.

“어깨에 힘이 잔뜩 들어간 상태로 유럽 배낭여행길에 올랐죠. ‘88 서울올림픽‘도 멋지게 치뤘고, 월드컵 개최국 선정도 눈 앞에 둔 상황이라 ‘컴 프롬 코리아’(come from Korea)하면 다 알겠지하는 생각에 유럽땅을 밟았어요.”

하지만 그의 기대는 여지없이 무너졌다. 현지에서 만난 대부분의 유럽인은 한국이라는 나라를 전혀 몰랐다. 오히려 북한(North Korea)를 더 많이 알더라는 것. 서경덕씨는 “이듬해 월드컵 개최지 선정이 있는데 갑자기 가슴이 답답했다”고 당시를 떠올렸다. 그는 이어 그 때 그 기억이 자신을 한국 홍보 전문가로 이끈 계기가 됐다고 덧붙였다.

“길에서 만난 프랑스 파리의 교민들과 유학생들을 설득했어요. 8월 15일에 맞춰 에펠탑에서 태극기를 흔들며 애국가를 부르고자 했죠. 당일 에펠탑 앞에 약 300명의 유학생과 교포 등이 모였어요. 목이 터져라 애국가를 부르는데 모두의 눈에는 눈물이 맺혔죠. 그 때 처음 ‘한국을 전 세계에 제대로 알리겠다’ 결심했습니다.”

◆ “2002 한일월드컵, 우리 잔치로 만들 수 없을까?”
2001년 국방의 의무를 마친 서경덕씨는 2002 한일월드컵을 앞두고 또 한번 한국 알리기에 나섰다. 대한민국에서 열리는 월드컵, 하지만 일본을 먼저 기억하는 외국인들에게 ‘월드컵은 우리의 잔치’라는 사실을 알리고자 마음 먹은 것. 그렇게 해서 준비한 게 바로 ‘잔디자켓’이다.

“미국의 CBS-TV ‘믿거나 말거나’에 잠깐 소개된 ‘잔디로 옷을 만드는 사람’을 찾아 미국으로 향했습니다. 상암동 월드컵 경기자 잔디로 자켓을 만들어 김대중 대통령에게 입히겠다는 계획이었죠. 뉴욕에서 잔디맨 찾기란 강남에서 김서방 찾기보다 힘들었습니다. 뿌린 전단지만 해도 수십만장. 뉴욕의 지하철이란 지하철은 다 뒤지며 잔디맨을 찾아 나섰죠.”

그렇게 뉴욕 시내를 뒤지고 다닌 4개월. 서경덕씨는 결국 사설탐정을 찾아가 부탁했다. 서씨는 “4개월 동안 수집한 자료를 사설탐정에게 넘기니 하루만에 찾아 내더라”며 “4개월 동안 헛고생한 것을 생각하면 허탈했지만 그래도 잔디맨을 만나고 나니 그렇게 반가울 수 없었다”며 고생담을 털어 놓았다.

우여곡절 끝에 완성된 잔디자켓. 대통령이 입었을까. 결과부터 말하면 실패다. 청와대 측에서 곤란하다고 한 것. 서경덕씨는 “물론 대통령이 입었다면 더욱 한국 월드컵을 알릴 수 있었을 거다. 하지만 상관없다. 상암동 경기장 자켓으로 만든 자켓이 외신을 타고 세계로 퍼졌고, 그것만으로 당시 한국 월드컵을 알리는 좋은 기회가 됐다”고 말했다.

◆ “2005년, NYT에 ‘독도’ 광고를 처음 내다”
2005년. 3년 전에도 일보는 ‘독도가 자기네 땅’이라는 망언을 서슴지 않았다. 실제로 그해 2월 27일 일본 시네마현 의회가 ‘다케시마의 날’을 제정해 대외적으로 독도 영유권을 주장하기도 했다. 온 국민이 분노했고, 서경덕씨 역시 마찬가지였다. 그는 자비를 털어 뉴욕행 비행기에 몸을 실었고 세계 최고의 유력지 뉴욕타임즈에 광고를 실었다.

“감정적 대응보다 세련된 방법이 필요하겠다 생각했어요. 세계에서 가장 권위 있는 신문, 각국 정부 및 기관, 기업 등이 신뢰하는 뉴욕 타임즈에 ‘독도는 우리땅’이라는 광고를 실어야 겠다고 결심했습니다. 그렇게 탄생하게 된 것이 뉴욕타임즈 A면 (인터내셔널 면)에 실린 ‘독도는 우리땅(Dokdo is Korean Territory)’광고에요.”

하지만 뉴욕 타임즈에 광고를 하기란 생각보다 쉽지 않았다. 세계에서 가장 권위있는 신문인 만큼 돈을 낸다고 아무 광고나 실지 않더라는 것. 서씨는 4개월 수십개의 시안을 들고 뉴욕 타임즈 광고국을 들락거렸다. 처음에는 반신반의하던 광고국 직원들도 나중에는 고개를 끄덕이더니 인터내셔널 면 게재를 허락했다.

“광고 문구 하나 하나에 심혈을 기울였습니다. 여러개의 시안을 들고 뉴욕 센트럴 파크로 나가 일일이 조사를 했어요. 어떤 광고가 그들의 눈에 잘 들어오며 그들이 이해하기 쉬운지 살폈습니다. 다수의 의견을 받아 헤드카피로 ‘독도는 우리땅’을 강렬하게 심었어요. 서브카피로 ‘이 사실을 일본이 인정해야 한다’고 넣었죠.”

◆ “영토문제, 역사왜곡…세계 권위지에 알린 우리 문제”
서경덕씨의 한국 바로 알리기는 여기서 멈추지 않았다. 이후 월스트리트저널(2005), 워싱턴 포스트(2007), 뉴욕 타임즈(2008), 또 뉴욕 타임즈(2008)까지. 세계적인 매체에 4차례 광고를 더 실었다. 최근 가수 김장훈과 함께 뉴욕 타임즈에 실은 ‘독도’ 전면광고도 그 중 하나다.

“세계 모든 기업이 필독하는 최고 권위의 경제지 월스트리트저널에 동해 표기에 관련한 광고를 게재했습니다. ‘한국과 일본 사이의 바다는 동해(East Sea)’라는 광고였죠. 지난 2000년 동안 한국과 일본 사이의 바다는 ‘동해’로 불렸고, 동해에 있는 독도 역시 한국의 영토이다. 일본은 이런 사실을 직시해야 한다는 내용도 함께 실었어요.”

이후 2007년에는 워싱턴 포스트에 위안부 문제와 관련한 의견광고를 실었다. 다시 미국 의회의 ‘위안부 결의안’ 상정을 앞두고 위안부 여성들에 관한 지지를 호소하는 내용이었다. 서경덕씨는 이어 미국 하원과 언론사, 정부기관, 일본 총리와 정부, 언론, 기업 등에 위안부와 관련한 잘못된 사실을 지적하고 진짜 진실을 편지로 적어 직접 보냈다.

게다가 올해 초에는 중국의 동북공정을 비난하는 의견광고를 냈다. 뉴욕 타임즈 18면에 실린 ‘고구려’라는 제목의 광고가 바로 그것. 그는 412년 당시 고구려가 만주를 차지하고 있는 한반도 주변의 지도와 함께 ‘고구려는 의심할 여지가 없는 한국 역사의 일부분이다. 중국 정부는 이 사실을 인정해야 한다’는 내용을 담았다.

◆ “세계 곳곳에 대한민국 브로셔를…”
서경덕씨의 한국 알리기는 크게 3가지다. 영토에 관한 것, 역사에 관한 것, 그리고 마지막이 문화에 관한 것이다. 서경덕씨는 “문화야 말로 가장 부드럽지만 가장 강한 것이라는 굳은 믿음이 있다”며 과거 진행했고, 현재 준비중인 문화 프로젝트를 설명했다. 그 중 하나는 한글 알리기 였다.

“우리가 가지고 있는 자랑스러운 언어, 한글을 세계에 알리고 싶었어요. 그래서 생각한 게 한국어 안내서죠. 한국어 안내서는 2가지 효과가 있어요. 일단 한국 사람이 외국 박물관에 갔을 때 우리 안내서를 보면 얼마나 뿌듯하겠어요. 박물관 감상도 용이하겠죠. 반대로 외국 사람이 한국어 안내서를 보면서 ‘한국이라는 나라에 고유한 언어가 있구나’라는 것을 자연스레 알게 되겠죠.”

실제로 그는 뉴욕 현대미술관(MOMA)과 메트로폴리탄 미술관에 직접 제작한 한국어 안내서를 비치했다. 다음달에는 세계에서 가장 크다는 워싱턴 스미스소니언 박물관 한국관에는 영문으로 된 안내서를 제공할 예정이다. 모두 서경덕씨의 손으로 직접 제작한 안내서다.

뿐만 아니다. 한국미술을 세계 곳곳에 기증하는 프로젝트도 진행중이다. 일례로 서씨는 설치미술의 대가 강익중 선생의 도움을 받아 한국적인 미를 살린 한글 작품들을 세계적인 장소에 보내고 있다. 현재 유네스코 본부에 강익중 作 ‘청춘’이 상설 전시돼 있다. 올 가을에는 하버드 대학교에 강익중 作 ‘청춘예찬’을 기증할 예정이다.

◆ “아직, 한국에 대해 알리고 싶은 게 많아요”
지난 15일 일본정부는 교과서 해설집에 독도와 동해의 영유권을 주장했다. 서경덕씨는 이에 대해 의외로 담담한 모습을 보였다. 그는 “일본의 교과서 역사 왜곡은 어느정도 예상을 했다. 이런 일본 정보의 전략에 휘말릴 필요가 전혀 없다”며 “국제사회 일본정부의 역사왜곡이 얼마나 부당한지를 알리고 독도가 우리땅인 것을 지속적으로 알리면 된다”고 말했다.

이어 교과서 문제에 대한 프로젝트도 이미 진행중이라고 덧붙였다. 그는 “일본에서 유학하는 후배들에게 부탁해 교과서를 현지에서 모으고 있다. 조만간에 미국 유력지에 이 같은 내용을 실을 예정이다”고 설명했다.

또 하나, 이 문제를 ‘문화’로써 풀겠다는 의지도 보였다. 그는 “8월 말 개봉하는 독도 관련 다큐멘터리 영화 ‘미안하다 독도야’를 세계 각국 영화제 다큐멘터리 부문에 출품해 독도 문제를 정치적이 아닌 문화 코드로 풀고 싶다”며 말한 뒤 “한인 동포들에게도 영화 DVD를 보내 그들이 올바른 역사관을 가질 수 있도록 도울 것이다”고 밝혔다.

서경덕씨는 지난 12년간 누구보다 치열하게 살아왔다. 누가 시켜서 한 일도 아니었다. 그렇다고 장미빛 미래가 보장되지도 않았다. 그가 한국을 알리려 젊음을 바친 이유는 무엇이었을까. 도대체 아무도 하지 않는 일을 하는 이유는 무엇일까. 그의 대답은 간결했다.

“다음 세대를 위해서입니다. 부끄럽지 않으려고요. 지금 대한민국에는 영토와 역사 등 실타래보다 더 복잡하게 얽힌 문제들이 많아요. 그냥 넘어 간다면 훗날 나의 아들, 딸 세대 들에게 고개를 들 수 없을 것 같네요. 아직 세계에 알릴 것도 많고, 바로 잡을 것도 많습니다.”

Dok island is a part of korean territory

Hey, Japan.. Shut up!!! Stop bothering us. Dok Island is korean territory.

(The New York Times Advertisement)

   The Territorial Dispute Over Dokdo

Dokdo:

 Dokdo consists of two tiny rocky islets surrounded by 33 smaller rocks. The Dokdo islets are located about 215 kilometers off the eastern border of Korea and 90 kilometers east of South Korea’s Ullung Island. The islets are an administative part of Ullung Island, North Kyongsang province, under the control of the Department of Ocean and Fisheries.   Dokdo is also 157 kilometers northwest of Japan’s Oki Islands.  Its exact position is 37° 14′ 45″ N and 131° 52′ 30″ E.   Of the two Islets that make up Dokdo, Suhdo (the West islet) is a steep-sided rock about 100 meters high, while Dongdo (the East islet) is 174 meters high.   The approximate total surface area of Dokdo is 0.186 square kilometers (56 acres).  Both rocks, about 200 meters distant, are the remains of an ancient volcanic crater and are a refuge for Petrels and black-tailed gulls and several, partly endemic plants.The government of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) designated Dokdo ‘Natural Monument No. 336′ in 1982.   The government generally does not allow private individuals to visit the island, but as of early 2005, the Korean government is expected to further lift restrictions on civillian visits to the islets.

The first historical references to the island were cited in Korean documents, which make reference to them as a part of an independent island state known as “Usankuk” (Ullung Island) which was incorporated into the Korean Shilla Dynasty in 512 AD.  Dokdo was first registered on charts in Europe after a French expedition under the leadership of Jean F.G. Perouse travelled to the East Sea/Sea of Japan in May of 1787, naming Ullung Island as “Dagelet”, for a French astrologer, and Dokdo as “Boussole”, after the name of one of the ships on the expedition.   It was not until 1849, when French whale-hunters gave the name of their ship to the islets, that Dokdo began to be called “Liancourt Rocks”.   Other names have been ascribed to Dokdo (“Manalai and Olivutsa Rocks” by a Russian warship in 1854, and “Hornet Rocks” by the British, after one of their ships, the Hornet in 1855) but the name “Liancourt Rocks” is the only one of these names that is commonly seen on (usually older) English-language maps and sea charts published since 1910. The island was known to Koreans as “Kajido” (Sealion Island), “Sambongdo” (Three-Rock Island) and “Sokdo”. Since at least 1881, the island has been called Dokdo by Koreans, meaning “Lonely Island” or “Rock Island”, depending on the Sino-Korean character that one uses for the word, “Dok”.   Since at least 1905, the islets have been known by the Japanese name “Takeshima”, but were previously known to Japanese as “Matsushima” or the “Rykano” islets.

  Rival claims

 Both Japan and Korea lay claim to Dokdo, and both claim a long historical and geographical connection with the islets. 

 The Japanese Claim

 

The Japanese assert that they had incorporated Dokdo, an island that they considered to be a terra nullius, into the Japanese Empire on February 22, 1905 when the Govenor of Shimane prefecture proclaimed the islets to be under the jurisdiction of the Oki Islands branch office of the Shimane prefectural government under the name “Takeshima”, cited in Shimane prefectural proclamation number 40 of that year.   This action by the Japanese government came about when, in September 1904, a Japanese fisherman from Okinoshima (Oki Island) named Yozaburo Nakai requested to be given exclusive rights to fish and hunt sealions in the area of Dokdo (Nakai later recounted that he initially believed the island to be Korean territory, and attempted to submit a request to the Government of Korea, but was dissuaded of this idea by the Japanese Fisheries Bureau Director, Maki Bokushin [...learn more]).   The fisherman also asked that he be given a ten-year lease of the island for sea lion hunting.   Officials in the Japanese Government took Nakai´s request one step further and appealed to the government for the formal incorporation of the island.   After having declared Dokdo (Takeshima) as a part of Imperial Japan in February 1905, Japanese officials entered the island´s name in the State Land Register for Okinokuni, District 4 on May 17th of that year.  

 

 

 

 

Who Was Nakai Yozaburo?

 On June 5th, Yozaburo Nakai´s request came through when he and three others were given permission by the Shimane prefectural government to hunt sea lions at Dokdo.   In the year that followed, the prefectural government posted a territorial sign and conducted inspections and surveys of Dokdo.   On April 24, 1939, a decision to incorporate the island under the jurisdiction of Goka Village was made by the Goka Village Assembly on Oki Island, Shimane Prefecture.   Imperial Japan had also made use of Dokdo in a military capacity, when they named the islets “Maizaru” Naval Station on August 17, 1940, restricting the island to purely military uses. With Japan´s defeat in the Pacific War in 1945, the victorious Allied Powers renounced the Japanese claim to Dokdo.  Under U.S. military occupation (1945-1952), the highest governmental authority in Japan was the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), which delimited Japanese administrative territory.   SCAP´s first major opinion concerning the territory of postwar Japan was cited in an instruction SCAP gave to the Government of Occupied Japan.   The order, SCAPIN (SCAP instruction) #677 of January 29, 1946 specifically outlined Japanese territory and stated that the islands disputed between Japan and Korea- Utsuryo Island (Ullungdo), Liancourt Rocks (Dokdo), and Quelpart Island (Chejudo) were to be excluded from Japan’s administrative authority.  However, to SCAPIN 677 was added this caveat: “nothing in this directive shall be construed as an indication of Allied policy relating to the ultimate determination of the minor islands referred to in Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration.”   Dokdo´s exclusion from Japan remained SCAP policy throughout the occupation, (another instruction, SCAPIN 1033 of June 22, 1946, prohibited Japanese nationals from approaching within 12 miles of Dokdo).  With Dokdo´s territorial status yet to be determined by a peace treaty between Japan and the allied powers, U.S. authorities in Japan decided to use the island as a bombing range.

In June 1947, the Japanese Foreign Ministry appealed to the U.S. occupation authorities over Japan’s claim to sovereignty over both Ullungdo and Dokdo in a treatise entitled, “Minor Islands in the Sea of Japan”, hoping to influence U.S. opinion in any future deliberations concerning the island that would take place in the upcoming peace treaty negotiations.   The Japanese ministers denied Korea’s ownership on the grounds that “no Korean name exists for the island” and that Dokdo “is not shown on the maps made in Korea”.   The Japanese document also argued that the settlers on the island had just arrived recently and that the island´s development was “still in an incipient stage”, and because of this, it was not within the Korean government´s ability to develop the island.

The Japanese efforts to regain Dokdo during the negotiations of the peace treaty eventually failed.   Although the 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty between Japan and the former allied powers settled sovereignty over the islands of Ullungdo, Kommundo, and Chejudo (all to Korea), the ownership of Dokdo was not settled in the treaty.

The reasons for the omission of Dokdo´s sovereignty from the treaty are many.   One important reason why Dokdo´s sovereignty was left unanswered by the peace treaty was that the president of the Republic of Korea (ROK), Yi Seung-man (Syngman Rhee) did not effectively focus his government´s attention on the ownership of Dokdo when negotiating with U.S. authorities over Korea´s territorial concerns.   The Korean president instead focused on an unrealistic demand for Korean sovereignty over Tsushima Island (as a form of war reparations from Japan, an idea which the drafters of the treaty never seriously entertained). Much of his attention was also focused on suppressing domestic political rivals than with maintaining his country´s territory.   In fact, the Rhee government never bothered to produce a scholarly, well-documented study of the Korean historical record on Dokdo that could offer the American drafters of the peace treaty an alternative to the Japanese Foreign Ministry´s monograph, “Minor Islands in the Sea of Japan”.

Even after the peace treaty was signed and talks on the normalization of relations between the ROK and Japan were underway, the Korean demand for recognition of their country´s sovereignty over Dokdo continued.   This was particularly the case after a bombing incident at Dokdo on September 15, 1952 had raised awareness in Korea over the impending fate of the island.   Another development that heightened the Dokdo issue in the minds of the Korean public was when the Korean president announced the establishment of a territorial line (sometimes called the Rhee-Line, or Peace Line) in the East Sea/Sea of Japan on January 18, 1952, that encompassed Dokdo on Korea´s side of this line. This growing demand from Korea placed U.S. authorities in the region in the undesirable situation in which the U.S. would have had to pick sides in a territorial dispute between Korea and Japan, whose cooperation with the U.S. and each other, was important to U.S. strategic designs.   The documentary record shows that the Americans increasingly attempted to distance themselves from the dispute.

U.S. Diplomatic and Military History of Dokdo (1945-1952)

The only ROK high-official that tried to effectively campaign for Korea´s claim to Dokdo before the peace treaty went into effect was the Foreign Minister, Pyun Yung-tai, who   argued for Korean ownership of the islets based largely on the decisions made by SCAP immediately after the Pacific War.   If it hadn´t been for Dr. Pyun´s efforts, Korea´s stand on Dokdo might never have been understood by influential U.S. officials, since other Korean arguments for sovereignty over the island were neither clear nor consistent during this period.   Unfortunately for Korea, the American authorities who made the decisions to exclude Japanese sovereignty over Dokdo at the beginning of the occupation (the SCAP Headquarters Government Section), were not the same Americans involved in drafting the territorial sovereignty provisions in the San Francisco Peace Treaty.   Instead, American judgements on these issues were largely governed by those in the Diplomatic Section of SCAP, led by a great American friend of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, William Sebald.   As Acting Political Advisor in Japan (essentially General MacArthur´s acting “Foreign Minister”), Sebald´s long involvement in Japan and strong personal connections with Japanese officials influenced his opinions towards the ownership of Dokdo, evident in his communications to the US State Department.   In the end, however, the ownership of Dokdo was considered too contentious to handle, and it was left out of the final draft of the peace treaty.  Thus, the failure of the San Francisco Peace Treaty to resolve the legal ownership of Dokdo is a major reason why the rivalry over the island continues between Japan and Korea.

Years later in 1966, the Japanese Foreign Ministry produced an extensive study on the history of the island.   This study, Takeshima no rekishi chirigakuteki kenkyu (An Historical and Geographical Study of Takeshima), was authored by a Foreign Ministry researcher by the name of Kawakami Kenzo.  The Foreign Ministry of Japan has since used Kawakami´s research as the Government of Japan´s basis for its claim to sovereignty over Dokdo.   Kawakami attempted to show that Koreans were not aware of the existence of the island.   He asserted that the island that Koreans cite in their Choson Dynasty (1392-1910) documents as Dokdo simply does not exist.   He also states that Dokdo is not visible from Ullungdo and that Koreans did not have adequate navigation skills (until the late 1800s, when Japanese people taught the Koreans proper sea navigation) to reach Dokdo by boat, and therefore Koreans could not possibly have been aware of the island.   This is a very interesting assertion, since Koreans travelled by boat from all points on Korea´s east coast to Ullung Island, but (according to Kawakami) somehow could not make the much shorter trip from Ullungdo to Dokdo.

Based on the above precedents, Japan still declares Dokdo to be within its territorial boundaries.   The Japanese still consider their 1905 incorporation of Dokdo into the Japanese territorial sphere as legally binding.   They also believe that previous opinions of occupation authorities were made null and void by the 1952 peace treaty.  Since 1954, the government of Japan has been inviting the Koreans to take the issue before the International Court of Justice.   The Koreans have consistently refused, stating that Dokdo is not a disputed territory, but simply Korean territory.

To this day Dokdo is on Japanese registers as a part of Goka Village, Oki-gun, Shimane Prefecture. The Japanese government has even allowed their citizens to declare themselves residents of the islets.

Why won’t the Koreans agree to take the Dokdo issue before the International Court of Justice?

The Korean Claim

 

 

The Koreans, however, lay their claim to Dokdo based on earlier and more numerous precedents than Japan.  They point to the document that named it as a territory that was first incorporated into the Korean Shilla Dynasty in 512 AD. They also point to various land surveys and maps that were drawn in later centuries that do, in fact, show Dokdo (in its accurate geographic position) to be Korean territory.   Some of these documents were even published in Japan: Japanese cartographer Dabuchi Tomohiko cited Dokdo as Korean territory in “Kankoku Shinchishi (New Geography of Korea), Teikoku Encyclopedia Number 134″, published in September 1905; six months after the islets were “incorporated” into Shimane Prefecture.   In a survey of Korea that was requested by the Colonial Government, Ihohara Fumiichi referred to Dokdo as belonging to Korea.  In a 1930 article, Japanese scholar Hibata Sekko mentioned that Dokdo belonged to Kangwon Province, Korea.   The Japanese Navy had also cited Dokdo as an appended island to Ullungdo, and Korean territory, in its 1923 publication, “Chosen Engan Suiroshi” (Korean Coastal Straits).

Koreans also complain that the Japanese took advantage of Korea’s political weakness vis-a-vis Japan in 1905, when the islets were registered as a part of Shimane prefecture, Japan.   Koreans rightfully argue that Korea had not been able to effectively protest the Japanese action at the time because Japan had had already taken control of the foreign affairs of Korea via the Protectorate Treaty of 1905, also known as the “Eulsa Treaty” or the “Second Japan-Korea Agreement”.  (The ratification of the treaty itself had been forced on Korea by the Japanese delegation to the treaty “negotiations” led by Ito Hirobumi and General Hasegawa Gonnosuke, with no signatures given by either the King or the Prime Minister of Korea.)  The Korean side also points out that the Japanese did not inform the Korean Government of their claim until 1906, and then only indirectly.   Upon learning of Japan´s decision, Korean officials in 1906, at both local and national levels, did in fact recognize and document the Japanese action as a violation of Korean sovereignty.   However, due to the loss their nation´s independence and foreign affairs capability, no action was taken.   Currently, the Japanese Foreign Ministry website states that it was not necessary for Japan to inform other countries of this territorial acquisition.   This contrasts sharply with Japan’s action when it acquired the Bonin (Ogasawa) Islands in the Pacific.   Then Japan contacted Great Britain and the U.S. several times, which were only remotely involved in them and it notified 12 European countries of its establishment of control over the islands.

To bolster their claim to Dokdo, Koreans also point to the opinions SCAP rendered on no less than three occasions during the occupation that excluded Dokdo from Japanese control.

Koreans have also pointed out the falsehoods in the Japanese Foreign Ministry-sponsored 1966 study by Kawakami Kenzo. Kawakami´s disparagement of Korean Choson Dynasty documentation has been shown to be baseless.   Futhermore, the claim that Dokdo was not (is not) visible to Korean eyes on Ullungdo is also a falsehood, since Dokdo is visible at a height of 120 meters or higher in elevation from Ullungdo, an island with a maximum elevation of 985 meters.

Japanese have also made claims that Japan´s “effective management” of Dokdo had been in place as early as the 17th Century, when the Japanese merchant families Otani and Murakawa obtained permission from the Japanese Government to travel to Ullungdo. Not only was Japan´s “effective management” of Dokdo highly improbable at this time (the merchant families were interested in exploiting Ullungdo, not Dokdo), it also creates a contradiction in the Japanese claim. In 1905, the Japanese recognized the islets as a terra nullius, and therefore ownerless (never having been managed) before that time.   This contradiction has never been fully addressed by official or unofficial sources in Japan.   Probably as a result of this contradiction, the Japanese Foreign Ministry Website no longer mentions the fact that Japan incorporated Dokdo as a terra nullius.

Yet another problematic issue for the Japanese claim to Dokdo, particularly Japan´s 1905 ´incorporation´, is the existence of a land survey conducted by Korean authorities in 1900, known as Korean Government Imperial Ordinance No. 41 (Article 2), which stipulated that the Ullungdo-kun office was to have jurisdiction over Sokdo (Dokdo).   This Korean Government order was promulgated on October 25, 1900; over four whole years before Japan sequestered the island as a terra nullius.   Japanese critics of this ordinance assert that the island named in the document, Sokdo (in Sino-Korean characters), is not Dokdo, but refers to the island Kwanumdo; an island that is almost penninsular in appearance and in the far Northeastern corner of Ullungdo.   The evidence by which they conclude that Sokdo is Kwanumdo has never been explained.   It is difficult to believe that Sokdo is Kwanumdo, based on Kwanumdo´s history, appearance and topography, and as “Dokdo” and “Sokdo” essentially mean the same thing: “rock island”.   As the text of the ordinance was written in Sino-Korean (Chinese) characters, the name appears as “Sok”, and not the dialectal pure Korean, “Dok”.

 Historical Context: 1870s-1905

Therefore, despite the seemingly “legal” aspects of Japan´s incorporation of Dokdo into the metropolitan area of Japan, the Japanese action must be seen from an historical point of view.   It must be remembered that Dokdo was annexed together with the rest of Korea, when Japan extended its Empire over the former Korean state in the period, 1900-1910.   Japan´s ´acquistion´ of Dokdo resulted from an overall increase in Japanese aggression in Korea in the late 1800s, when Japan began to openly acquire monetary rights, railway, mining, and fishing concessions in Korea, in addition to conducting outright invasions of Korea´s outlying islands.   At first, when Japanese civilians began exploiting Korean islands like Ullungdo in the late 1800s, the Japanese Government acquiesed to Korean Government complaints and removed Japanese civilians who were illegally fishing and logging.   The Japanese Dajokan, the Council of State, even ruled in 1877 that “our country has nothing to do with” Ullungdo and Dokdo .  

However, the Japanese position changed after the Sino-Japanese (1894-1895) and Russo-Japanese (1904-1905) Wars, when these Japanese victories boosted Japan´s willingness and power to control the areas just outside of territorial Japan.   The Korean islands in this area of the East Sea/Sea of Japan (Kommundo, Chejudo, Ullungdo and Dokdo) were seen to have value to the Japanese military in the Russo-Japanese War, and the Japanese military essentially invaded these sovereign Korean territories to establish watchtowers and to link them via submarine telegraph cables.   It was also during this war with Russia that the Japanese public began to become aware of Dokdo, since many of the naval battles between the Russian and Japanese fleets took place in the area of Ullungdo and Dokdo.   Previously illegal Japanese civilian encroachment in this sea area (and indeed the rest of the Korean peninnsula) was encouraged by the Japanese Government in this period. It was in this milieu of Japanese imperialist advance into Korea that Nakai Yozaburo approached the Japanese Government to secure exclusive rights to Dokdo, resulting in the Japanese acquisition of the islets.

Therefore, the Japanese incorporation of Dokdo into Shimane Prefecture was intimately connected to, and a result of, Japan´s imperialist aggression in the early 20th Century.   However, the Foreign Ministry of Japan still clings to its belief that the territories it acquired in the period of 1894-1910 were “internationally recognized”, and therefore were acquired validly.   It is quite curious that Japan continues to hold onto a claim of territorial sovereignty that was enacted at a time when Japan was engaged in imperial expansion.

A final thought on this issue…

The Cairo Conference of 1943 stipulated that “Japan will be expelled from all territories which she has taken by violence and greed [since the time of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95].” Considering Japan´s methods, there can be little doubt that Japan´s annexation of Dokdo in 1905 (along with all other Korean territories by 1910) falls within the definition of territories taken by greed, as defined by the Cairo Declaration.

If Japan believes that its methods in acquiring Dokdo in 1905 were legitimate, then Japan must believe that it can still, by the same logic, claim sovereignty over the rest of the Korean Peninnsula…

Conflicts in the 1950s

In the 1950’s, South Korea took active measures to stake its claim.   The first was in September 1952, when then president Yi Seung-man (Syngman Rhee) sent a research vessel to Dokdo (resulting in the aforementioned bombing incident), causing the territorial dispute to capture the public’s attention in Korea and Japan for the first time.

The conflict over dokdo escalated considerably in 1953 and 1954, beginning with ROK president Syngman Rhee´s establishment of the “Peace Line” or “Rhee Line” on January 18, 1952, in which South Korea placed a territorial boundary line that extended out into the East Sea/Sea of Japan to encompass Dokdo:  Much to the chagrin of the Japanese Foreign Ministry.   Over the next two years, Japanese patrol vessels would approach within close distance of the island and attempt to, and sometimes actually land on the island.   These patrols would provoke reactions from the Korean volunteer coast guards, who kept watch over Dokdo since being stationed there on April 20, 1953 and led by Korean War hero, Hong Soon-chil.   In an incident on June 27, 1953 crews of two Japanese coast guard vessels, led by Tomizo Sawa and Nobuo Igawa, drove six of the Korean coast guards from their base on the East Islet to the West Islet, landed on the island, and erected a Japanese territorial marker on the shore.   This action had little effect in Korea, since most of the government´s focus was on events concerning the end of the Korean War.   However, it was not forgotten by the president of Korea, when a year later, he sent a letter to North Kyongsang Province police chief Kim Jong-won, promising him a shipment of mortars and 100 rounds of mortar bombs for the Dokdo coast guards so that the weapons could be used to “scare off” intruding Japanese ships.   When issuing the orders, however, the provincial police chief changed the wording of the president´s orders from allowing the coast guards to “scare off” Japanese ships, to allowing them to “sink” Japanese ships.   On July 12, 1953, three Japanese patrol boats (two of which were named the ´Hekura-ho´ and ´Oki-ho´) arrived to stage their typical show of force.   Upon arriving at Dokdo, the Japanese ships came under mortar fire from the Korean forces on Dokdo.   The ships returned fire, but the Japanese lost one boat and suffered 16 casualties, including a number of deaths.   Yet another such incident occurred on August 24, 1954.

The Japanese Foreign Ministry angrily denounced the Korean “illegal actions” in a letter to Seoul on November 30th.   The Japanese demanded an official apology from the ROK and the removal of the Korean coast guard from the island.   The Koreans did not give in.   It was at this time that Japanese right-wing groups discussed plans to assemble an armed reaction force in an effort to “free Takeshima” from the Koreans.   In the end, this incident only really served to heighten the animosities felt by either side and undoubtedly slowed down rapprochement between Korea and Japan.

In 1954, the Koreans had also built a concrete lighthouse and building, and a helicopter landing pad on the East Islet The islets have remained under the protection of Korean maritime guards ever since.

Despite these setbacks for their claim, Japan has officially declared several times since 1949 that Dokdo is a part of Japan, with South Korea protesting against this territorial claim time after time.

Dokdo in the 1965 R.O.K./Japan Basic Relations Treaty

 Recent Conflicts

 The most serious recent row over the Islets came in February 1996 when Japanese Foreign Minister Yukihiko Ikeda publicly reaffirmed Japan’s territorial claim to the islets after South Korea made plans to build a wharf on them.  Certain Japanese ministry officials such as Ikeda, Miyaki and others occasionally make such statements in order to garnish more popularity among Japanese voters by sounding ‘tough’, regardless of how such behavior upsets neighboring countries.   In this case, the Korean defense ministry had had decided to cancel that year’s spring military maneuvers near Dokdo to avoid political friction, but changed back to their original plans after Ikeda made his statement.  Some time later, the Japanese “self-defense” forces conducted exercises in the same ocean that were meant to practice the re-occupation of an island.   Japan then later renamed the military drill a `landing exercise’ for fear of an overly negative reaction from Korea.   To Koreans, there was little doubt about what the Japanese forces were really practicing.

There has also been the constant controversy over Japan´s refusal to acknowledge the full history of the sovereignty dispute over Dokdo (in addition to other issues) in history textbooks published for Japanese high schools.   In April 2002, the Japanese Ministry of Culture and Science approved texts from the book publishing companies, Meiseisha and Jitkyosha, that question the Korean claim to Dokdo without even attempting to explain the Korean argument.   Such refusals by Japanese officials to even consider the existence of Korean claims to the islets in histories written in Japan reflect the Japanese resistance to attaining closure with their Korean neighbors over the Dokdo island dispute.   It also shows just how much Japanese attitudes have yet to mature on this issue. 

 Negotiation

 This conflict between Japan and Korea is not just about the ownership of the two islets.  Both countries consider the ownership of Dokdo as an anchor for their respective interests in the surrounding waters.  At stake are claims to about 16,600 square nautical miles of sea and seabed, including areas that may hold some 600 million tons of gas hydrate (natural gas condensed into semisolid form).   This gas hydrate is believed to be deposited along the broad seabed extending from Dokdo to Guryongpo, North Kyongsang Province. Gas hydrate is a next-generation energy source that could be made into liquid natural gas if adequate technology is made available.   The island is surrounded by fertile fishing grounds, and both sides frequently attempt to bolster their claims to it.  Also spurring the fishing competition is a fear of dwindling sea resources.   Japanese fishing officials say the depletion of fish stocks in other parts of the world means their country must rely more on waters closer to home.  The northwestern Pacific in general has more underused fish stocks than other areas, according to the U.N.

Today, few marine areas in East Asia remain unclaimed-and many claims overlap.  The global Law of the Sea Convention, which entered into force in November 1994 after more than 20 years of negotiation, embodies most international law and state practice relating to the oceans.  Under the treaty, every nation with a seacoast is entitled to exercise jurisdiction over resources and certain activities in waters extending as much as 200 nautical miles from a coastal baseline-an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).  The problems here lie in the details, and this is nowhere better illustrated than in the Law of the Sea Convention, in which the extent and degree of jurisdiction a nation exercises is determined by a host of arcane factors, including the drawing of baselines, distance from the coast, and the meaning of “continental shelf,” “equidistant lines,” and the like.

According to the convention, a nation can claim sovereign rights over resources and all related activities, as well as jurisdiction over artificial structures, scientific research, and protection and preservation of the marine environment, within its 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).  But because tiny islets that are only flyspecks on a map may be used as a basis to claim an Exclusive Economic Zone, many maritime disputes focus on the ownership of tiny islands, reefs, and other “features” such as Dokdo, the Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea, and the Spratly/Xisha Islands in the South China Sea.   Unfortunately, the convention offers little specific guidance for the settlement of boundary disputes. Thus nations may still feel a need to engage in provocative military posturing, and the possibility of military conflict remains.

The 1996 dispute over Dokdo only further stressed the already fragile relations between South Korea and Japan.  Nonetheless, ways have been found to deal with boundary uncertainty.  Under a joint-development approach, these countries agree on the extent of the area in dispute, set aside the actual boundary question, and reach agreement on joint exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons.  This strategy is supported by the Law of the Sea Convention, which stipulates that, pending agreement on the delineation of the continental shelf or the boundaries of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), states should try to enter into provisional arrangements.  Perhaps the strongest reason for a state to opt for a joint undertaking is to protect its interests in potential oil or gas deposits, combined with a desire to maintain good relations with the other state.  Joint development is an idea that may look increasingly attractive as the need for oil intensifies.  Japan and South Korea have taken such an approach, and have established 230-mile EEZs under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.   After years of negotiation, the two countries signed the treaty in July 1996, setting quotas and regulations in each other’s zones.

Continuing Anger

However, not everyone is happy.   Many Koreans were angered by the provisions of the convention, which meant that Korea had to share some of its sea space near Dokdo.   Many felt that Korea had “given into” the Japanese.   Other developments have also shocked Koreans. Recently, in an Asian Executive Poll conducted by the Review and Asia Business News, the majority of business leaders and the general public in 8 out of 12 Asian countries who participated in the poll believed that Japan, not Korea, had the stronger claim to the Dokdo islets.   Many Koreans see this as another example of “gross negligence” on the part of their government.  Partly because of this, Korean citizens have taken to the internet to assert Korea’s claim to Dokdo.  Countless Korean Dokdo websites and web-boards have come online.   Koreans have also been hacking into, and disrupting Japanese webservers that harbor pro-Japanese Dokdo websites.  Almost all domain names related to Dokdo are controlled by Koreans.   Dokdo related domain names such as ‘liancourt.org’, ‘tokdo.com’, ‘tokdo.co.kr’, ‘takeshima.com’, ‘takeshima.net’, ‘takeshima.org’, ‘takeshima.co.kr’, ‘tokdo.net’ and ‘takeshima.net’ were all snatched up by Koreans almost in the minutes immediately after they became available.   In cyberspace, Dokdo is entirely Korean territory. 

The resolution of the dispute over Dokdo is still uncertain.  Despite the agreement the two countries entered into in 1996, Japanese officials still make remarks that anger people in Korea, and Korean voices are getting increasingly indignant over the issue.  However, governments outside of Japan and Korea really have no interest in getting involved in the issue.  In cases like this, possession is nine-tenths of the law.   Therefore, Dokdo will probably remain in Korean hands; That is unless the Right Wing in Japan takes over and/or the Japanese pacifist constitution is rewritten to accommodate a Japanese military take-over of the Islets

In Conclusion…

To conclude, a quote from one of the contributors to the Guestbook is quite appropriate:
“…a war over Dokdo would be insane for both countries involved, and Japan in particular (because given the situation on the ground, it would have to start it). Which means if rational decision making is in play, this issue will be solved when one of the two — probably Japan — finally decides to throw in the towel. Until that time, this issue will continue to [hinder] bilateral relations until people in Tokyo decide to get smart and cut their losses.“

  

 

 

 (from http://www.forthenextgeneration.com/dokdo/)

Whittier cruise

생전 처음간 알래스카.. 기대보다 조금 못했지만 크루즈 여행은 정말 대단했다..

06/28/08 @whittier (Prince William Sound)(http://www.princewilliamsound.com/578.cfm?itemid=gac)

Cruise route (red line)

 

more pictures: http://picasaweb.google.com/eykim99/062808_whittier

Talk@JPL (06-18-08)

Building HAL :  Prospects for Autonomous spacecraft, past, present and future

Speaker: Dr. Steven chien, JPL (http://www-aig.jpl.nasa.gov/public/home/chien/)

처음 JPL도착해서 reception자리가 부실하고 그래서 좀 실망했는데..talk은 정말 훌륭했다.

NASA JPL의 현재까지의 연구 성과와 왜 AI가 우주 개발에 꼭 필요한지 명확히 그는 설명하고 있었고.. 그것을 보고 있으면서 한편으로는 안타깝고 부럽기도 했다.

미국은 이미 로봇을 머나먼 우주로 보내 스스로 탐사하게 할 계획을 가지고 있으며..화성도 잠깐 들려 관찰하는 정도가 아니라 계속 머물수 있는 환경을 구축하려고 하고 있다. 이를 위해 우주선 혹은 로봇들이 스스로 행동할수 있는 시스템이 필요하다는 것은 의심할 여지가 없다.  예를 들어 실제 몇광년 떨어진 곳을 움직이고 있는 로봇에게 프로그램을 사람이 업데이트 시킨다는것은 프로그램만 전송만 몇광년이 걸리기때문에 정말 무의미 해진다.

어쨋든 이 미국이라는 나라는 이 자원이 고갈되어 가는 지구라는 행성만 바라보는 것이 아니고 더 넓은 우주를 탐사할수 있는 지능형 우주선(로봇)을 만들기 위해 천문학적인 돈을 투자하고 있다.. 반면, 한국은 우주 개발에 필요한 돈도 기술도 아무것도 가지고 있지 않다.

물론, 한국의 사정을 알기에 우주개발을 못하고 있는 실정을 이해하기는 한다.  다만, 미국이 무인형 자동차(사고율을 줄일수 있음), 지능형 우주선(인간이 할수없음) 등 왜 필요한지에 대해 명확한 답변을 주는 연구를 활발히 진행하는 것처럼 한국에서도 모든 사람이 공감하고 필요로 하는 로봇 연구가 진행되길 하는 바램이 있다.

InSung Jo

 

내가 오랫동안 변치않고 좋아하는 배우 조인성…

 

삐쩍 마른 몸매에 잘생긴 얼굴은 아니지만.. 수줍게 웃는 미소에 계속 정이 간다.

항상 좋은 배우가 되려고 끊임없이 노력하고 겸손한 자세를 유지하는 그의 모습을 보면서 많은 것을 느끼고 또 배우고 있다..

대한민국 역사에 길이 남는..^^ 훌륭한 배우가 되길…

                                            

조인성

영화배우

출생

1981년 7월 28일

신체

186cm, 72kg

학력

전남과학대학 모델이벤트

데뷔

1998년 지오지아 모델

사이트

공식 http://zoinsung.sidushq.com/

 

  

 

Movie: A dirty carnival trailer(2006)

  

Commercial